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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
§57-1-32, Utah Code Ann., as amended, 1953. 
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action 
to recover balance due upon obligation for which trust 
deed was given as security — Collection of costs and 
attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of 
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, 
an action may be commenced to recover the balance due 
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given 
as security, and in such action the complaint shall set 
forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which was 
secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such 
property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at 
the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court 
shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of 
the property sold. The court may not render judgment 
for more than the amount by which the amount of the 
indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of 
sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds 
the fair market value of the property as of the date of 
the sale. In any action brought under this section, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its 
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing 
an action under this section. 
§78-37-1, Utah Code Ann., as amended, 1953. 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special 
execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by 
mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
Judgments shall be given adjudging the amount due, with 
costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged 
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount 
and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to 
proceed and sell the same according to the provisions 
of law relating to sales on execution, and a special 
execution or order of sale shall be issued for that 
purpose. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On t he IHtli II( November, 1980, Plnllipr; secured a IIMII 
f t i mi I1SCI1 in lr i.Njel hc»i u i i in i in I i i iu'i . n j i i n i i nn UUMI i JL t J HI i .ne 
I, S t a t e C r e d i t Union (M,1 " i , Defendant in t h i s a c t i o n and 
e x e c u t e d a P r o m i s s o r y Note t h e r e f o r e III hi mi n rev lo i i 
Hnmkrnpfry 11111 MiMMMnrn u i" nrmr i | M M | in I He a c t i o n , Uie loan 
was s e c u r e d by Iwn forms ot c o l l a t e r a l : in ' l i e n in Hn» 1 i m 
of a Trust |heeit »j11 t e a l p r o p e r t y owned hy h | j i>»* "<< "*d " w|' "" 
Neese . Lijil ,. I I la, a >.» i quint nl nl a J pa I i n s t a t e n o t e and mor tgnge 
h e l d Dy P l a i n t i f f and Neese ris m o r t g a g e e s , and C e n t r a l R a n c h e s , 
1 iii' , , aka Deser t S p r i n g s , lin- , a s mor tqaqor " S H M I 1 
n u t e " I , « i-nil i in( ini iual payments t o Neese and P h i l l i p s . 
(Exh ib i t , H # H 
P h i l l i p s f a i 1 PII i n make pay^em ** nn rnr nn in iiin I i in 
o< (iibei "r i
 ( Llnl1 served P h i l l i p s and IJeese wi th a w r i t t e n 
d e c l a r a t i o n of d e f a u l t . T h i s document was r e c o r d e d November *il, 
1985 . ( E x h i b i t H # I "'I II , |
 f | weu( , ( if,,, , mAi 
pa) inents on Lhe a s s i g n e d mor tgage wei e nut d e l i n q u e n t . 
In November, 1985, P h i l l i p s was i s s u e d a "-heck f roir 
Gua rd i an T i t l e in I hi iiinniiil i I > Nl n nn iiiaih | h i ^ < 11 J J c» j o i n t l y 
lu USCU and Vai l J , P h i l l i p s , Sa id cherk was i s s u e d pursuant ; t o 
and m c o n f o r m i t y wi th t In-* a s s i g n e d 1 qaqe m i h i t f #? ?M 
" h ' " I i f r f "i } "' ' " I -'.<> I U M ' i " h ,M ti i d i e c e i . u d 
this check during the entire default period under the Deed ol 
Trust although iz was more than sufficient to cum I lie in III . 
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(Trial Court Record (hereinafter "R") p. 45) (Exhibit C #4). He 
apparently kept this check, unnegotiated, for approximately one 
year. 
USCU exercised the power of sale provided for in the 
Trust Deed and conducted a Trustee's Sale on April 29, 1986. The 
property described in Exhibit A was at that time purchased by 
USCU for $90,000.00. The balance due on the note at the time of 
the sale was $112,566.30 leaving a balance still due after 
application of the sale proceeds. (Exhibit B #3). 
USCU first became aware of the issuance of the $27,850.00 
check from Guardian Title in November of 1986, when it received a 
letter from Guardian Title Company requesting the help of the 
Credfit Union to determine why the check had not been negotiated. 
(R. p. 45) (Exhibit C #5). 
USCU met with Vail Phillips later in November of 1986, at 
which time the issuance of the check was discussed by the 
parties. At that time, they discussed the possibility of 
depositing the money into an escrow account with USCU, but 
Plaintiff refused to so deposit the money. (R. p. 21). 
This check was then cancelled by Guardian Title and a new 
check was reissued by Guardian Title Company on December 11, 
1986, for the same amount. This second check was also concealed 
from USCU and was neither negotiated nor deposited by the 
Plaintiff. (R. pp. 8-10) (Exhibit C #7, #8). 
The amount requested by said check was ultimately 
collected by the Plaintiff on May 12, 1987, by way of execution 
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a g a i n s t G u . - i i n i 1 .u r i 1 ml h > i i imp iiiiiii i I Hi i i i i i i i i «i» Mi 
Oil JaiiUiti y i Plaintiff tiled this action, On 
April 29, 1987, the Honorable Leonard H 1' isnn granted 
Plaintiff' * Hot pm M i f>nf > » ' 'inmm M j ' «'qm^i'il . 
II i il tiled a request tor interlocutory review to the Utah 
Supreme Court winch request was denied on Auqust /Ml, 198/. 
o n I Hi j, in mi i i i mi mi in nil i ill i mi i i i ' i in I i n H U f i o r a L l e L e o n a r d H , 
Russon Lu iJttn'i I, the issue of damages. Final judgment was 
entered on June 9# 1989, denying any damaqps to either pai; 1 y . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUM-
• « nv-jb i ^ r iL ien t o f 
Mortgage oi ate parcelsoi ; rupprt illips md ^ s 
partner failed ",o M i ^pr4"? * s 
Bon judicially f oreclosed. 
P r i o r t o t h o f n r o c l o s u r p . P h i I I M M II in I MM MI HM! I I In i I 
mi ill i i\ ii made p a y a b l e j o i n t l y t o USCU and P h i l l i p s , The 
check was i s s u e d p u r s u a n t t o and in i m l o r m i t y w i t h I n 
a s s i g n m e n t " t mortqrrfe wt i. h */.t , I " .. . i I < " I i t e i \ I 
p l e u y e u , i i i.ps un n i b man wi th USCU. The a s s i g n m e n t was 
l e g a l and a b s o l u t e . 
Phi I I i | n w i I hlhii Id I- n wlodr|L ul MIL I i o< 11»I ml I linse Minds 
from ubiU for uven a y ^ n , l i iese funds which had been a s s i g n e d 
t o USCU wei e more Liian s u f f i c i e n t t o c u r e t h e d e f a u l t . 
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Furthermore, these funds were in excess of the balance still due 
after the foreclosure of the Trust Deed. 
USCU was precluded from filing for a deficiency for the 
following reasons. First, there was no deficiency. The money 
from the assigned mortgage was more than sufficient to pay off 
the remaining debt owed by Phillips to USCU. 
In this case, the security could not be liquidated 
because the mortgage which had been assigned to USCU was not in 
default. USCU could take no action on that mortgage unless it 
became delinquent. The funds were tendered properly by the title 
company, but improperly held and concealed by Phillips. 
Second, the One Action Rule as set forth by §78-37-1 
precluded USCU from filing for a deficiency. In order to file 
for a deficiency, USCU was required to first liquidate all its 
collateral. As set forth above, the additional collateral could 
not be liquidated. 
§57-1-32, does not preclude USCU from receiving the 
additional amounts owed from the further pledged security. This 
statute, as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, only prevents 
additional judicial remedies. Receipt of the additional monies 
coming to USCU under the note was not judicial remedy covered by 
the statute. Furthermore, had USCU sought judicial relief for 
deficiency against Phillips at this point it would have waived 
its right to the additional collateral. 
Thus it wasimpossible for USCU to comply with both §57-
1-32 and §78-37-1. Rules of Statutory Interpretation therefore 
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preclude the interpretation of §57-1-32 expressed by the Trial 
Court as it would defeat the intent of the statues and make their 
application an absurdity. 
Additionally, Phillips should be equitably estopped from 
working a fraud on USCU. Such will be the result if USCU is 
precluded from receiving the balance owed on its note from the 
security, namely the unnegotiated check which had been in the 
possession of Phillips for over a year. Clearly an individual 
should not be allowed to abuse the law by using it to perpetrate 
a fraud on his creditors. 
Finally, §57-1-32 does not bar a tort claim for 
conversion. The necessary elements for conversion having been 
found by the Trial Court, USCU is entitled, as a matter of law, 
to its claim for damages against Phillips. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. §57-1-32 IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
A. Utah Law Required USCU to Satisfy 
The Balance Due On The Debt By First 
Exhausting All Security Pledged. 
Utah State Credit Union was obligated under Utah Law to 
satisfy the balance due on the debt owed from Phillips by first 
exhausting all security before it could proceed against Phillips 
personally. This rule was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Bank of Ephraim v Davis, 581 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1978). Security 
must be exhausted as to both quantity and quality. Salt Lake 
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Valley Loan & Trust Co. v Millspauah. 54 P. 893 (Utah 1889); 
Bawden & Associates v Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982). 
Furthermore, no personal liability exists until all security 
pledged is exhausted. Hammond v Wall, 171 P. 148 (Utah 1917); 
Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. v Black, 618 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980). Once 
all security has been exhausted then a mortgagee can proceed 
against the mortgager personally, and then only through 
judicially available remedies, that is by means of a deficiency 
judgment for any deficiency. Cox v Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1985). 
The courts can impose personal liability on 
the mortgagor only after having ordered sale of 
the property; and, if after sale, a deficiency 
appears . . . The status of a mortgage debt under 
78-37-1 is somewhat analogous to one not yet due 
or one which lacks mutuality. Although the debt 
is past due, the creditor is not yet in a position 
to obtain personal judgment against the debtor, or 
to proceed to satisfy the debt out of the debtor's 
assets other than the mortgaged property. Davis 
at 1003. 
USCU was in the process of satisfying the balance due on 
Plaintiff's note by liquidating its collateral. Defendant could 
not maintain a deficiency action against Phillips while remaining 
security had still not been liquidated. Therefore, §57-1-32 
cannot have a meaningful application to this case. 
B. §57-1-32 Is Inapplicable Because 
There Was No Deficiency 
The amount credited by USCU from the Trustee's Sale was 
$90,000.00. This left a balance due of $22,566.30. The amount 
of the check from the title company which was intentionally 
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concealed from USCU by Phillips was for $27,850.00. These funds 
had been legally assigned to the Credit Union. The amount was 
more than enough to pay the balance still due by USCU. There 
being sufficient collateral remaining, in the form of the note 
and mortgage to meet the balance due on the loan from USCU to 
Phillips, there was no deficiency to sue upon. It was only upon 
the release of the assignment by the Trial Court that a 
deficiency occurred. 
In Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. v Black, 618 P.2d 43, 45 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court found that §78-37-1, known as 
the "One-Action Rule" limits a creditor to one remedy in 
exhausting his security before having recourse to the debtor for 
a deficiency. The Court found: 
Consequently, if the creditor (Plaintiff) here 
fails to comply with the statute in not applying the 
security to the Defendant's obligation in accordance 
with their agreement, that would preclude its recovery 
of any deficiency against them. Utah Mortgage & Loan 
Co. at 45. 
Since no deficiency arises until all security is 
exhausted, and since the security could not all be exhausted at 
that time as there had been no default upon the assigned mortgage 
and note, no action could be taken to recover any deficiency 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32. 
In a case somewhat analogous to the present, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Bawden & Associates v Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 
1982) found: 
Where two mortgages were foreclosed in one 
suit but only one was sold, a deficiency judgment 
could be entered against the mortgager only if 
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the unsatisfied mortgage with respect to the 
parcel sold, plus costs and attorney's fees were 
more than the sale price, and deficiency could not 
be entered with respect to the second parcel until 
it also was sold and proceeds applied against the 
indebtedness and costs secured thereby." Bawden & 
Associates at 714. 
Applying the Courtfs reasoning to the current case, where 
only one of the two items of security was foreclosed and sold, 
USCU could not obtain a deficiency judgment against Phillips 
unless the unforeclosed security, the mortgage and note, was 
worth less than the remaining unpaid balance of the loan. 
Clearly, in this case, that was not so. The check concealed by 
Phillips was more than sufficient to pay the remaining balance of 
the loan. Therefore, there was no deficiency and §57-1-32 is 
inapplicable. See also First Security Bank v Felger, 658 F. Supp 
175 (D. Utah 1987). 
In its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment the Trial 
Court apparently relied upon Cox v. Green, Supra, and Concepts. 
Inc. v First Security Reality Services, 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 
1987). These two cases, however, a clearly distinguished from 
the instant case. In those two cases the only security was a 
Trust Deed upon a single parcel of property. Therefore upon 
foreclosure, all security was exhausted. The instant case can be 
further distinguished from Cox and Concepts, Inc. in that, in 
both Cox and Concepts, Inc. the creditor was attempting to 
recover damages against the debtor personally. In the instant 
case, USCU was only seeking to retain its valid interest in the 
additional security. Therefore, the Court's holding in Cox and 
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Concepts, Inc. is inapplicable to the instant case. 
C. Plaintiff Should Be Estopped From 
Perverting The Intent of §57-1-32. 
§57-1-32 and §78-37-1 were both created to prevent double 
recovery by creditors and to prevent creditors from any over-
reaching. See First Security Bank v Felcrer, 658 F. Supp. 175 (D. 
Utah 1987). The statutes were not created to allow a debtor to 
defraud his creditors. In the current case, the debtor, 
Phillips, had in his possession monies to which USCU was legally 
entitled. He willfully concealed those funds from USCU. (R. p. 
12-14). 
Those funds were sufficient to clear any default on the 
loan prior to the Trust Deed foreclosure and were more than 
sufficient to meet the balance owed after the foreclosure sale. 
(R. p. 13) . 
A finding therefore, that Phillips is entitled to a 
reassignment of the note and mortgage and its proceeds, is an 
endorsement of Phillips1 devious efforts to avoid payment of his 
just debt to USCU. 
POINT II. USCU'S COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PHILLIPS 
SHOULD BE GRANTED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A. Plaintiff's Conduct Constitutes 
Conversion Of USCU's Property 
Utah follows orthodox criteria in applying the doctrine 
of conversion. Benton v. Division of State Lands & Forestry. 709 
12 
P.2d 362,365 (Utah 1985). 
A conversion is an act of willful interference 
with a chattel, done without lawful justification, 
by which the person entitled thereto is deprived of 
its use and possession . . . 
Although conversion results only from intentional 
conduct, but it does not require a conscious wrong 
doing, and an intent to exercise dominion or control 
over goods inconsistent with [their] owner's right of 
suffices. Allred v Hinkley. 328 P.2d 726 at 728 (Utah 
1958). 
The Record of the Trial Court shows that Phillips knew 
the check he received from the title company was 
part of the security pledged to USCU. (R. p. 11) The Record 
further shows that Phillips knew his note to USCU was in default. 
(R. p. 12) . 
After default a debtor has lost his right of possession 
in property subject to a security interest and retains only a 
contingent right in the surplus, if any, after the sale. Murdock 
v Blake. 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 (1971). 
Phillips1 counsel admitted that the assignment was a 
valid one. (R. p. 38). Furthermore, the Trial Court found that 
the Credit Union was entitled to the payment. (R. p. 36). In 
spite of USCU's meeting all the criteria necessary for a claim of 
conversion, the Trial Court held no claim existed because of the 
bar against collections of deficiencies more than ninety (90) 
days following foreclosure. (R. p. 41). Such a reading of the 
statute is clearly overbroad. 
The tort action for conversion is completely separate 
from any action that could have been brought for a deficiency, 
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had one existed. This is simply a matter of one party, Phillips, 
exercising unlawful control over the property of another, USCU. 
Surely the statute could not be read so as to preclude 
the eviction of a person whom has been foreclosed on, if the 
eviction action is taken over 90 days after a foreclosure. Yet, 
using the Trial Court's reasoning this would be the application 
of the statute. Independent causes of action cannot be barred by 
§57-1-32 where they do not comprise an attempt to obtain a 
deficiency against a debtor. Therefore, USCU's claim for 
conversion, having been established as a matter of law, should be 
granted. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court erred 
in awarding Judgment against USCU for the following reasons: 
(1) USCU was prevented from bringing a deficiency action 
against Phillips pursuant to the One-Action Rule until all its 
collateral had been exhausted. 
(2) There was no deficiency, and therefore no cause of 
action under §57-1-32, until the Trial Court's release of the 
assignment of mortgage and note to Phillips. 
(3) The Trial Court's interpretation of §57-1-32 is 
erroneous as it conflicts with §78-37-1. 
(4) Phillips should be equitably estopped from pleading 
§57-1-32 as a defense, because to allow him to do so is to put a 
judicial stamp of approval on Phillips' devious attempts to avoid 
payment of his just debt to USCU. 
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(5) U.C.A. §57-1-32 is inapplicable as a defense to 
USCU's Counterclaim. 
(6) Phillips' conduct constitutes conversion of property 
of USCU. 
Appellant, therefore, respectfully requests that the 
Judgment of the District Court be reversed with respect to its 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denial of USCU's Counterclaim 
against Plaintiff, and that this Court award Judgment to 
Defendant as a matter of law in the amount of $22,560.30, 
together with interest, costs and such other relief as is 
appropriate. 
Respectfully Submitted this day of January, 1990. 
DALE R. KENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day 
ofJanuary, 1990, four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
document were mailed to Byron L. Stubbs, 53 0 East 500 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84102. 
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EXHIBIT A 
A - 1 
Exhibit 1-P and this is the check which YOU previously 
identified. Tell me when that check was issued? 
A Well, I think that check was originally issued 
in 1985. 
Q No, that particular check. 
A This particular check? 
Q Sir, what is the date on the check? 
A It shows December 11, 1986. 
Q So then, this isn't the check that you 
testified you talked to Terry Rawiings about? 
A Well, I had a check prior to this time that I 
talked with Terry about. 
0 Let me show you what your counsel has marked as 
Exhibit 2-P. Is this the check then that you say you had 
in your possession at the -cime you talked to the credit 
union? 
A I would think so. 
0 What is the date of tnat check? 
A That cne is November I?, 1985. 
Q Now, do you recall why there are two checks for 
the same amount? 
A I am nor sure. 
MR. STUBBS: For the record, I have no 
objection tc 2-P, assuming it is offered. 
MR. KENT: No objection. 
THE COURT: 2-P is received. 
Q (By Mr. Kent) Isn't it ~rue that Exhibit 1 was 
simply a re-issue of Exhibit 2"? 
A One check was a re-issue of the former check. 
Q So represented the same thing? 
A Same thing. 
Q So, Exhibit 2, the earlier check, was never 
negotiated, cashed or anything else done with it? 
A No. 
Q Did you just tear it up? What happened to it? 
A It was returned to the title company. 
Q Now, I think you told me you are certain that 
this conversation with the credit union took place after 
the foreclosure; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And you talked to Terry Rawlings? 
A Right. 
Q Now, is it not true, that the reason you were 
there to talk to Terry Rawlings was because he called you 
to ask you where is the check? 
A No, that isn't true. I had a number of 
conversations with Verl Wright and Veri Wright set up an 
appointment for me to go up and talk to Terry Rawlings. 
It was my instigation and not Terry's. 
MR. KENT: I see. That is all the questions I 
have. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stubbs. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STUBBS: 
Q Mr. Phillips, you have indicated, I want to pin 
down again exactly when you had the conversation, as near 
as possible. The Notice of Default which Mr. Kent sent 
out was sent in November of 1985? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have a recollection of receiving that? 
A Yes. 
Q Now then, the foreclosure sale was held in 
April of 1986? 
A Right. 
Q When did your conversation, did it take place 
after the Notice of Default and before this sale, or 
Mr. Kent's question was: After -che foreclosure, which 
would not have been completed until after April? 
A Well, I would think it was after *che 
foreclosure. 
Q And you had no conversations with the credit 
union from the time you received the Notice of Default 
until after the sale in April? 
A Yes, I had several with the fellow downstairs 
mostly about my ability to take care of the payments, but 
10 
I was not in a position that I could continue payments. 
Q Prior to the foreclosure sale, did you have any 
conversation with anyone at the credit union with regard 
to the check that you had in your possession? 
A I can't remember. 
HR. STUBBS: I have no further questions. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KENT: 
Q What was the purpose of this check we are 
talking about? Why did you have this check? 
A Well, that was a payment or. the mortgage that 
we had assigned to the credit union. 
Q And there had been payments prior to this one, 
had there not, made to you pursuant to that assignment of 
mortgage? 
A You say there had been payments on this 
mortgage prior? 
0. Yes. 
A Yes. there had. 
Q And, in fact, in past years isn't it true that 
from the time you executed the note with the credit 
union, you would have received a waiver from the credit 
union in order to negotiate the checks or so the check 
would be made directly payable to you without the credit 
union's name on it also? 
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A Yes, we had done that. 
Q You had done that in the past. Mow, you 
received this check, Exhibit 2, m November of 1985; 
isn't rhat correct? 
A Yes. 
Q A^d it is $27,000? 
A Yes. 
Q And that represented a payment on a mortgage 
which had been assigned to the credit union, did it nor? 
A That was representative. Yes, it was a payment 
on a mortgage. It had been assigned to the credit union. 
Q And your loan with the credit union about this 
time was in default, was it not, was delinquent? 
A I think it was m default from something like 
September to November when they — when the Notice of 
Default was served. 
Q And von never brought that check into the 
credit union, though, .lid you, to cure the default? 
A No. 
Q Even "enough that check had been made payable 
jointly to yourself and the credit union; is that not 
true? 
A That is true. 
Q Even tnough you were aware that that money 
coming in on that mortgage had been assigned to the 
12 
credit union for security for payment cf your note; is 
that not true? 
A That had my note been current, that would have 
been reassigned to me anyway. 
0 So, the question was, you knew when you kept 
the money tShat rightfully that money belonged to the 
credit union because you had assigned that money to the 
credit union? 
A No, I don't believe it belonged to the credit 
union. 
Q You have testified you were aware and knew the 
effect of the assignment of the mortgage: isn't that 
right? 
A After the mortgage — 
Q Excuse me. The question was, is it not right 
that you are aware at the time you received that check 
that-that money had been assigned by you to the credit 
union to pay your note? Is that net true? 
A It was assigned for additional collateral for 
that note, yes. 
Q Now, so you could have cured the delinquency at 
any time, at any time, if you had simply tendered that 
check to the credit union, couldn't you? 
A I could have brought it current, I guess, with 
that check. 
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Q And you refused tc :o that, didn't you? 
A I didn't do it. 
Q And is it not zrue tnat you didn't even re11 
the credit union that you had the check? 
A I don't remember wnen the credit union became 
aware that I had the check. 
Q Well, let me refresh your recollection. Is it 
not true that the credit union didn't become aware that 
you had the check until November of 1986; is that not 
t rue ? 
A No, I am sure it was before November of 1986. 
Q Was it then, by your recollection, during this 
conversation you had with the credit union about 
depositing that check which was some time after April of 
'86? 
A I would say it was some time between April and 
it was prior t? the time that w^ filed suit. 
0 It is your testimony also, is it not, that vou 
did net tell tne credit union you had this cneck until 
after the foreclosure had been completed? That is true, 
isn't it? 
A That :s true. 
MR. -".EMTi That is all the Questions I have. 
Your Hcncr. 
14 
to clarify the matter. Then I called Mr. Phillips on the 
phone and asked him about the check. 
Q Was anyone else present during that 
conversation that you recall? 
A No, I don't believe so. 
Q Will you relate to me what that conversation 
was? 
A I just asked him why he had not approached us 
with the check to have it endorsed so we could have 
applied towards the proceeds of his loan. 
Q And what was his response? 
A He wanted to come in and try and talk about it. 
So subsequently we set up an appointment and he came in 
and to talk about the check, and I asked him if he would 
like to put it on deposit in the credit union until the 
matter could be resolved and apparently he wasn't 
agreeable to that because txhe check was never deposited 
at the credit union. 
Q You say, though, you did offer to allow this 
check to be deposited and held in escrow pending the 
resolution of who was entitled tc the money? 
A Yes. 
Q And he refused to do that? 
A He was not agreeable to putting it en deposit 
at the credit union, correct. 
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MR. STUBBS: Forged it? 
THE COURT: He forged it and put it in his own 
account someplace else. Do you think you could stand 
here today and say they can't go after us on a 
deficiency, so they are out the money on that? 
MR. STUEBS: But that didn't happen. 
THE COURT: But we all agree if it had 
happened, it doesn't matter that the credit union can't 
go after him on the deficiency. They would still be 
entitled to that check that had been wrongly forged. We 
all agree on that. 
MR. STUEBS: On a different theory, on a 
different theory entirely. 
THE COURT: Now, we come down to where there 
was a legal assignment, an assignment of the payments I 
suppose that the credit union was entitled to. 
MR. STUEBS: And I think — 
THE COURT: And he has withheld that from them 
and now your argument is the same: "But it is too late 
because, after ail, they can't come after us on a 
deficiency. 
MR. STUBBS: They knew they had the assignment 
and they knew the check was to be made. They could have 
sued and foreclosed, which they did, and sued on a 
deficiency and executed on the check just like we did 
around for a year? 
MR. KENT: 1 don't think we are. Mo. 1, that 
is not the case where he has money that he owes us and he 
doesn't have the money. That is not this case. This 
case, he has got money that belongs to — that is in the 
hands of a third party. All he has is evidence ct it. 
The third party has got the money. He knows that money 
was pledged. He knows that payment is due to the credit 
union and he intentionally hides that from them. It is 
not his money, but it is someone else's money that is due 
to the credit union. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Was this a 
legal assignment? Was this an actual assignment of his 
rights to that real estate contract to the credit union? 
MR. STUBBS: Yes, it was assigned, Your Honor. 
MR. KENT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Then, why isn't that money there? 
MR. STUEBS: It was assigned to them and it 
would have been theirs and they would have been entitled 
to it had they not accepted the property that they took 
as primary security as full payment of the debt. They 
accepted the property. 
THE COURT: Now, we come back to that argument. 
Once you take "he property on the foreclosure, then you 
forego that right? 
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clarified from the testimony I have heara toaay and I am 
going to let my prior ruling stana, cut I can understand 
the argument ana it isn't -- it certainly isn't an open 
and shut case. Iz certainly isn t a case of bad faith 
and it certainly isn't a case that they don't have an 
argument and the cnances are good you will both go 
througn the cost of an appeal. I could well be reversed 
and ycu are back here again. But I can understand your 
argument, and it is a technical, legal cne and I 
understand ycur argument. It is more an equitable one. 
but I think ycu nave got a legal argument too. And the 
question comes down -- There is no question in my mind, 
if he had forgea the instrument, there is no question 
that tnat had nothing to do with the deficiency. He had 
to give them bacK the money. 
Now, we step baci: cne step ana say: In this 
?ase^ T.ere was an assignment and ne carried tnat zheck 
deficiency cr net? That is really the issue. That is 
what we really come aown to. And Mr. Stubbs is arguing, 
'It reaily isn't because when they foreclosed they took 
it in lieu of. and if there is a deficiency, they ran 
file an answer. Your argument was. Mo, we didn't take 
it. We were ^ntit^ea tc it to begin with and it has 
nothing to ao with tne deficiency," That is it for an 
41 
appeal, and I can see that coming. Okay, go ahead with 
your argument on interest and att:rney fees. 
MR. KENT: I am through with the interest. 
Just the attorney fees that the parties indicated under 
Katie vs. Johnson. You get attorney fees under that. 
The faith statute, you have got to show bad 
faith, or that the defense is not asserting in good 
faith, and it is done with the intent to defraud, hinder, 
those kind of things. And it is clear that was net done 
in this case. The statute is inapplicable. Just because 
we are ruled against, does not mean the defense was not 
meritorious or without merit. Certainly, as the Court 
has indicated, we have strong legal principles that we 
are standing on. The attorney fees aren't proper under 
that statute. 
The other statute that talks about if attorney 
fees "are provided for in a contract, the one side or the 
other side gets them. That is inapplicable because that 
statute on its face says for contracts or notes entered 
into after April 23, 1986, then that rule applies. These 
were entered into years before that. So, that doesn't 
apply either. 
The third ground upon which Mr. Stubbs asserts 
they might be act lied and entitle?, to some attorney fees 
has to do with this case, that he cited and talks about 
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know about this check is six or eight months down the 
road, and a year later the check is issued. And on that 
basis I will submit they are not entitled to any further 
relief. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stubbs, anything further? 
MR. STUBBS: Yes, the one point on the interest 
that he talked about in the beginning of his argument, 
Your Honor. I don't think it is that difficult to 
determine a date when the interest starts in this case. 
They have the foreclosure sale. They have got 90 days 
from the date of that foreclosure sale to file for a 
deficiency. They don't file for a deficiency, therefore 
the interest starts on the date of the foreclosure sale, 
not 90 days after that. That is when they started it. 
It is not that difficult. We didn't speculate on the 18 
percent or the 20 percent of what he was paying. I 
wouldn't let him do that if he wanted to. I'd say, "You 
have got to stick to tne legal rate of interest, which is 
10 percent." We have no ambiguity as to the time or 
ambiguity as ro the amount because we stuck with the 
legal figure. 
Other than that, Your Honor, I submit it. I 
think the Court pretty well understands. 
THE COURT: The Court makes the following 
findings in regards to the evidence given, that the 
credit union was unaware of this check, the check of 
November, 1985. They became unaware of it until November 
of 1986, and that the inquiry was made by a 
representative of the credit union of Mr. Phillips, when 
the credit union was contacted by the title company 
concerning the check that was still outstanding. 
The Court is going to find that there was a 
failure on Mr. Phillips tc mitigate in this matter, and 
the Court has already expressed its grave concern I think 
concerning that check and the entitlements in regards tc 
that. But understands the arguments made of counsel and, 
on balance all things considered, is going to allow its 
prior ruling to stand in regards to that. 
As to prejudgment interest, the Court is going 
to deny the same on the grounds that it is not really 
fixed and unliquidated and cannot be really determined, 
and the Court is also going to deny the attorney fees. 
It certainly is not a frivolous :r bad faith effort on 
the part of the defendants in this matter, and the Court 
will deny the motion for attorney fees. Deny the 
attorney fees, as well as the interest f:r the reasons 
stated in the defendant's memorandum in this regard. 
Nov; I suppose that ties it all back up so that 
it can new be appealed and they will accept it on appeal, 
and we will see what they do with this matter. 
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EXHIBIT B 
B-1 
BYRON L. STUBBS (3145) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
530 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84102 
(801) 328-4207 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAIL J. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-87-311 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and in 
response thereto the defendant also filed such a motion; oral 
argument on both motions was heard by the court on the 13th day of 
April, 1987; counsel for the parties filed written memorandums of 
points & authorities and the court having reviewed said memorandums 
as well as the pleadings of the respective parties on file in this 
case, and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, on or about the 18th day of November 1980, 
borrowed from defendant $150,000.00 and gave said defendant as 
security for said loan a Trust Deed. As part of said original 
transaction the plaintiff, as additional security, assigned to 
defendant a real estate mortgage and note owned by plaintiff. 
2. Plaintiff failed to make payment to defendant on the 
§150,000 note secured by the trust deed, and on the 29th day of 
October 1985, defendant served plaintiff with a written declaration 
of default which was recorded November 21, 1985. 
3. Subsequent thereto and pursuant to said notice of 
default, a trustee sale was held on April 29, 1986, and the property 
covered by said trust deed securing the $150,000.00 note was 
purchased by the defendant at the trustee's sale for the sum of 
$90,000.00. 
4. Plaintiff filed this action demanding reassignment of the 
mortgage and note given as additional security together with any and 
all proceeds now due or to become due thereon based upon the fact 
that more than three months had passed since the date of the sale of 
the real property and the defendant failed to commence an action for 
any deficiency pursuant to §57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated. 
5. Defendant claimed that it was not estopped from 
continuing to collect monies due on the debt until the balance was 
paid in full after the trustee's sale. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court concludes that §57-1-32, supra, as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Cox v Green 696 P2d 
-2-
1207 (Utah 1985), provides the exclusive procedure for securing a 
deficiency judgment following a sale of real property under a trust 
deed, and plaintiffs1 election to sell the property to satisfy the 
debt and failure to comply with said section precludes them from 
seeking any other remedy. 
2. The defendant in this matter elected its remedy of 
non-judicial trust sale and in doing so was required to comply wich 
§57-1-32, Utah Code Annotated, which requires that the action be 
filed within three months of the date of sale. Defendant, having 
failed to comply, is now precluded from seeking any other remedy 
including a deficiency against the plaintiff. 
3. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should by reason 
of the foregoing be granted, and the mortgage and note in question 
should be re-assigned to him together with any and all proceeds now 
due or to become due thereon. 
4. Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
DATED this ^ 7* day of April, 1987 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
DALE R. KENT 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this -£--2^ day of April, 
1987, to: 
Dale R. Kent 
Attorney for Defendant 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake Citv, Ut 84111 
EXHIBIT C 
C-1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VAIL J. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION, 
A Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-311 
Motions for Summary Judgment filed by both parties came 
on for hearing on April 13, 1987. Following argument of counsel, 
the Court took the matter under advisement. The Court has now 
reviewed the file, the Memoranda of Points and Authorities filed 
by both parties, and the authorities cited, and herein renders 
its decision. 
The plaintiff made a loan from the defendant in the amount 
of $150,000.00. Plaintiff gave defendant a trust deed note, 
and trust deed in regards to the said lean. As "additional 
security'1 plaintiff assigned a real estate mortgage and note 
to the defendant. 
Plaintiff failed to make payments on the note, and on October 
29, 1985 defendant served plaintiff with a written declaration 
of default. This document was recorded November 21, 1985. 
After notice, a trust deed sale was held on April 29, 1986, 
where the property was purchased for $90,000.00. 
PHILLIPS V. U . S . C . U . PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
P l a i n t i f f f i l e d t h i s a c t i o n , d e m a n d i n g r e a s s i g n m e n t of 
t h e m o r t g a g e n o t e , a n d c e r t a i n p r o c e e d s i n r e g a r d s t h e r e t o , 
u p o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t more t h a n t h r e e months had p a s s e d a f t e r 
t h e s a l e of p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t t h e d e f e n d a n t commencing an a c t i o n 
f o r a n y d e f i c i e n c y a m o u n t s p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 5 7 - 1 - 3 2 , Utah 
Code Ann. 
D e f e n d a n t c o u n t e r c l a i m e d , c l a i m i n g t h a t i t was n o t e s t o p p e d 
f rom c o n t i n u i n g t o c o l l e c t m o n i e s p u r s u a n t t o t h e a s s i g n m e n t 
of m o r t g a g e , u n t i l t h e d e f i c i e n c y amount of $ 2 2 , 5 6 6 . 3 0 was r e c e i v e d . 
B o t h p a r t i e s f i l e d Mot ions f o r Summary J u d g m e n t , p l a i n t i f f 
c l a i m i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was bound s t r i c t l y t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s 
of S e c t i o n 5 7 - 1 - 3 2 , and upon f a i l u r e t o f i l e t h e a c t i o n w i t h i n 
t h r e e m o n t h s a f t e r t h e s a l e of t h e p r o p e r t y i s f o r e c l o s e d from 
c l a i m i n g a n y d e f i c i e n c y amount a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f , and t h e 
d e f e n d a n t c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n a l s e c u r i t y r e p r e s e n t e d 
by a s s i g n m e n t of t h e m o r t g a g e was s u b j e c t t o t h e one a c t i o n 
r u l e , a n d t h a t a d e f i c i e n c y c o u l d n o t b e s o u g h t a g a i n s t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f u n t i l t h e s e c u r e d i n t e r e s t was e x h a u s t e d . 
S e c t i o n 5 7 - 1 - 3 2 s t a t e s : 
At a n y t i m e w i t h i n t h r e e m o n t h s a f t e r any s a l e 
of p r o p e r t y u n d e r a t r u s t deed , a s h e r e i n b e f o r e p r o v i d e d , 
an a c t i o n may b e commenced t o r e c o v e r t h e b a l a n c e 
d u e u p o n t h e o b l i g a t i o n f o r which t h e t r u s t deed was 
g i v e n a s s e c u r i t y , and i n s u c h a c t i o n t h e c o m p l a i n t 
s h a l l s e t f o r t h t h e e n t i r e amount of t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s 
w h i c h was s e c u r e d by such t r u s t d e e d , t h e amount f o r 
w h i c h s u c h p r o p e r t y was s o l d , and t h e f a i r m a r k e t 
v a l u e a t t h e d a t e of s a l e . . . . 
PHILLIPS V. U.S.C.U. PAGE THFEE MEMORANDUM DECTSIOM 
• -•.;~^ r._CL^ ^^ ^^  -." ^ .•-' <• l'.-~ •-•-• ^  <uCdii j/385) . in a somewhat 
analogous situation defendants moved to dismiss a complaint 
upon the g^cundc t-.hat tae. plaintiffs did nc'O file their deficiency 
claim in the time required by statute. The Utah Supreme Ccr^-' 
» 
Lrated: 
The t r i a l court ruled, and we agree, t h a t section 
57-1-3 2 provides the exc lus ive , procedure f~\. 
.. ._ .- - - wi'uji uced. P l a i n t i f f s 1 
e l e c t i o n t o s e l l the p r o p e r t y t o s a t i s f y t he debt 
precludes them t>om seeking any other remedy, including 
da.739.ges .,fcr
 :b^3c.ch. cf ./o^ntract.,. which n igh t have.;-been 
•;^ ;\^ .-v^ i:ri;>.c-- ^D'i'tv:/^ . ..-£-:,*;v&: ;?.laiT7tif£s ' act ion v a ^ . r o : 
;vvi:;--*c .^v :^^ Hv.-T7^ ;^:^ ^» :-:s;;r;!^5v\;'o; --the date-.cf1 the t rus tee 's 
•v.vu:^^.f^^-n^• -.reci',. property, the trial court did net 
The defendant in this matter elected its remedy : * non-
judicial trust: sr^ie, an..; in doina. so ver-° r°^::r2d <: rr;' • 
"", ..u -^.ect;v.yT r?7 • •'. " • •'• • ^ :.:-.-...-, - .^tJ- ncu'cS T.O a 
deficiency, an acv.:rr. for the same had to be filed wichm .h-:-
-0 W " -L . v'ime required by \o.. 0 sratute. This requirement 
;
 he fair wariest va^. ~ . -".rement a^e necessary t\.r tr.^  ;:  rotpct:. • 
of the dr^tnr "• • • • ' ' tor .ioeks the remedy of a nc -.-juiici: 
trustee sale, Such '/.is :::t done in this case, therefore, defenda: 
is precluded fcom any chains cf deficiency against the plaiut ::. 
PHILLIPS V. U.S.C.U. PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Since defendant has no right as to a deficiency against 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to have restored to 
him the mortgage and proceeds in regards thereto. 
Plaintiff! s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant * s 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
Plaintiff will prepare the Order and Summary Judgment. 
Dated this / ^  day of April, 1987. 
I %\ L €C- n a r:C H , CLLZZQ n 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
PHILLIPS V. U.S.C.U. PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this day of April, 1937: 
Byron L. Stubbs 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
530 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dale R. Kent 
Attorney for Defendant 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
EXHIBIT D 
D-1 
Pi! r 
iLED !M CLE-.\"3 OFFiC' 
••• n - . h SzllUUr c»>-rt: 
APR 20 1937 
BYRON L. STUBBS (3145) ;' ~(j"~"" 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
530 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 328-4207 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAIL J. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil 
Judge 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
No. C-87-311 
Leonard H. Russon 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, together with 
defendant's motion for summary judgment came on before the 
above-entitled court on the 13th day of April, 1987, and after oral 
argument being- made by the parties respective counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment be and the same is hereby granted, and the mortgage and 
note in question should be forthwith reassigned to plaintiff 
together with all proceeds now due or to become due thereon. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary 
judcment be and the same is ,^erebv denied with prejudice. 
DATED this day of April, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DiXON HI.NCL'IY 
Cic:x 
y\,Lu.: •ISC// ' 
JUEXJE 
/ 
BYRON L. STUBBS (3145) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
530 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 328-4207 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VAIL J. PHILLIPS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-87-311 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
On the 13th day of April, 1987, plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, together with defendant's motion for summary 
judgment were heard by the above-entitled court; counsel for both 
parties presented oral argument to the court and filed written 
memorandums of points and authorities therewith; the court having 
heard said arguments, reviewed said memorandums and the pleadings on 
file in this case, and having fully advised itself in the premises, 
and having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment be and the same is hereby granted, and defendant is 
ordered to restore and assign to plaintiff the mortgage and note in 
question herein together with all the proceeds now due and or to 
become due on said note and mortgage. Said note and mortgage which 
is to be restored and assigned to plaintiff is attached to this 
Judgment, marked as Exhibits I and II, and by this reference made a 
part hereof as if fully set forth herein. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment be and the same is 
hereby denied with prejudice. 
DATED this day of April, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE 
Aooroved as to form 
DALE R. KENT 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing 
Judgment %.0^*^day of April, 1987, to: 
Dale R. Kent 
Attorney for Defendant 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111 
EXHIBIT E 
E-1 
I DALE R. KENT (1800) | 1200 Kennecott Building 
i! 10 East South Temple 
nSalt Lake City, Utah 84133 
(Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
|| IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
!| SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE Or UTAH 
I.VAIL J. PHILLIPS, : SUPPLEMENTAL 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND || Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW |l 
l  vs * : 
i' Judge Leonard H. Russon 
IUTAH STATE CREDIT UNION, : 
i«a Utah corporation, 
|l Defendant. Civil No. C-87-311 
Is The above-entitled natter came en regularly for trial 
'•"before the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of May, 1989, 
t 
i 
Ithe Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding; and the Plaintiff 
(being present and represented by his attorney, Eyron L. Stubbs; 
'and Defendant being present through its officers and represented 
bv its attornev, Dale R. Kent; and the Court having heard the 
.testimony of the parties, and having heard the Stipulation of 
'.the parties with resard to the narrowine of issues presented; 
;, 
land being fullv advised in the premises; and the Court havine 
i 
ii 
Dreviouslv made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with 
i 
fregard to the Crder Granting Partial Summary Judgment, which 
i 1 
lOrder was entered in Aoril, 1987; and being fullv advised in the 
ii 
I h 
|| 
.(premises, the Court, therefore, renders the following: 
|! FINDINGS OF FACT 
j! (1) The Findings of Fact previously entered by the 
|| 
ijCourt are hereby adopted and incorporated as though fully set 
!;forth herein. 
i 
i : 
•j (2) In November 1985, the Plaintiff was issued a check 
;:from Guardian Title in the amount of $27,850.00 made payable 
ii 
iijointly to Utah State Credit Union and Vail J. PhilliDS. 
i, 
i 
j- (3) Said check was issued pursuant to and in conformity 
'/.with the Assignment of Mortgage which was the additional collat-
eral pledged on the Plaintiff's loan with the Defendant. 
|| (4) The Plaintiff failed to disclose to the Defendant 
:!that he had received said check during the entire default period 
.under the Deed of Trust. 
:j (5) The Defendant first became aware of the issuance of 
• i 
,the check in November of 1986 when it received a letter from 
(Guardian Title Company requesting Mountain America Credit 
Union's help in determining why the check had not been negoti-
ated. 
;' (6) The parties met later in November of 1986, at which 
•time the issuance cf the said check was discussed by the 
! 1 
i 
.parties. A.C Char zL~e, they discussed the possibility cf 
i; 
i d e p o s i t i n g the money in to an escrow account w i th the Defendant , 
j1 
jbut the Plaintiff refused to so deDOsit the money. 
II 
II 
Ii !i 
(7) This check was subsequently cancelled and a new 
jcheck was reissued by Guardian Title Company on December 11, 
'1986, for the same amount. 
j (8) The second check was also never negotiated or 
[deposited by the Plaintiff. 
• | (9) The amount referenced by said check was collected 
jlby the Plaintiff en Kay 12, 1987, by way of execution against 
II 
[.Guardian Ti t le Company. 
11 
II i (10) This Court can make no finding as to the time unon 11 o 
[which the Plaintiff's cause of action against the Defendant 
•I 
['arose. 
(11) Mountain America Credit Union, in refusing to 
it 
i endorse the check over to the Plaintiff, did not in any manner 
I! 
j intend to hinder, delay, defraud, or take advantage of the 
t' 
i'Plaintiff. 
j i 
;i From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court new 
| enters the following: 
'• CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
M 
I ; 
jj (1) The Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages, 
jl 
iif any, in this matter. 
j! (2) The damages, if any, claimed bv the Plaintiff were 
| J 
II , . 
[unliquidated. 
ii (3) The defense of the Defendant was asserted in gocc 
i i 
llfaith. 
(4) The Defendant was not negligent in its handling of 
this matter. 
(5) The Plaintiff should not be awarded prejudgment 
interest, nor attorney's fees in this matter. 
; ST Jl^~ I) Ur-k^ 
| DATED this °] ^ day of &ZT} 1989. 
! BY THE COURT: 
I 
9 
Jiidge Leonard H. Russon 
ij 
|Approval as to form: 
iByron L.Stubbs 
' I 
ij MAILING CERTIFICATE 
i 
• ! The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day 
i1 . — 
,of May, 1989, a true and correct-copy of tne foregoing document 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
I ! 
1 
'
!
 Eyror. L. Stubbs 
\ 530 East Fifth South, Suite 10 
, Salt Lake City, UT 8^102 
DRK03 
i 
EXHIBIT F 
F - 1 
JDALE R. KENT (1800) 
[McKay, Burton & Thurman 
1200'Kermecott Bu i ld ing 
110 Eas t South Temple 
(Salt Lake C i ty , Utah 84133 
jTelephone: (801) 521-4135 
i 
| IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGMENT 
Judge Leonard H. Pocsson 
Civil No. C-87-311 
h 
»> The above-entitled case cane on reguiarlv for trial 
i1 
!before the above-entitled Court on the 12th day of Mav, 1989, 
i ! 
i 
/the Honorable Leonard E. Russon presiding; and the Plaintiff 
H 
being present and represented by his attorney, Byron L. Stubbs; 
i ' 
and Defendant being present through its officers and representee 
i 
by its attorney, Bale R. Kent; and the Court having heard the 
\\ 
•evidence introduced at the trial, and the stipulation of the 
i 
11 
[parties regarding narrowing of the issues to be tried; and the 
ii 
.Court having urevicuslv entered its Findings of Fact and Con-
It * 
' i 
'elusions of Law anc Judgment with regard to the Order Granting 
• i 
Partial Summary Judgment; and the Court having previously 
i 
e n t e r e d i t s Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
.VAIL J . PHILLIPS, 
Ii Plaintiff, 
i v s . 
'.UTAH STATE CREDIT UNION, 
j'a Utah corporation, 
11 Defendant. 
11 
Law; now, therefore, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
(1) The prior ruling of the Court shall be and the same 
Ijshall remain in full force and effect. 
it 
[j (2) The Plaintiff's claim for monetary damages and 
i! 
jlprejudgment interest shall be and the same is hereby denied. 
|| 
;! (3) Both parties shall assume and pay their own attcr-
ij 
Lney's fees incurred in the prosecution of this action. 
BY THI COURT: 
DATED this 7 / day of £&r, 1989. 
i! 
5, 
• j KondraDle Leonard H. Russon 
i; 
•'Approval as to form: 
iBvron L. Stuobs 
I. ' 
j; MAILING CERTIFICATE 
h 
ij The undersigned hereby certifies that on the cay 
i; 
;of Ma]/, 1989, a true and correct copv of the foregoing document 
i i * w 
/was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
l! 
j! Bvron L. Stubbs || 5*30 East Fifth South, Suite 10 
! Salt: Lake City, UT 8^102 
l! 
}l 
JDRK03 
